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Thursday, May 19, 2011

Why Isn’t Google Chrome A Part Of Android?



Over the past couple of years covering Google, there’s one seemingly simple question that comes up again and again, that Google just can’t seem to answer. Why isn’t Chrome a part of Android?

Read the wrong way, that could seem like a deep question. But it almost never means “why isn’t Chrome OS simply merged with Android?” or the like. Most of the time, it’s simply a question wondering why Google’s very popular web browser is not a part of their very popular mobile operating system? After all, that OS has a browser (the aptly-named “Browser”), but it’s not Chrome. Why not?
Unsurprisingly, the question came up once again at Google I/O last week. During a panel with a bunch of engineers on the Chrome team, it was one of the first questions asked. The response? “It’s not something we’re talking about right now.” Ouch.

“I don’t know how to answer that,” the engineered continued. Okay…

Another team member, probably realizing those answers sounded both cryptic and harsh, chimed in. “The important thing at the end of the day is to make browsers better. While it’s not strictly Chrome, we share a lot of code with the Android team. We’ll share more over time.” Okay, that’s better. Still, a bit odd.

Based on my understanding, after having a number of discussions on this topic over the years, it would seem that boils down to a few things. First, the Android team is a completely separate team from the Chrome team. Second, it’s a branding issue that Google isn’t quite sure how to resolve. Third, the Android browser, while similar to Chrome, really isn’t Chrome.

The first and second issues are interesting because more and more, they’re related. As they showcased at I/O this year, Google now is fully backing two horses in the OS race: Android and Chrome OS. Each are made by two entirely different teams that don’t often mix with one another.

As Google executives kept saying over and over again when asked last week, the two OSes have different goals — and are going about things in completely different ways. While Chrome may have started out as a web browser, it’s now much more from an ideology perspective inside of Google. No one will admit this, but if they’re to ultimately succeed, they sort of have to believe that Android won’t. That makes it hard to work together.

When Android first launched in October of 2008, it seemed like either a small oversight or precautionary measure that the browser bundled with it wasn’t branded as Chrome. After all, Google’s browser had just launched in beta (on Windows) the month before. Assuming people liked it, you would have assumed that Google would transfer the branding over to use in Android, right?

Well people did like Chrome. A lot. And yet, Google never moved it over. This despite the fact that Apple did just that on the iPhone with its much less successful Safari browser. Meanwhile, Opera and Mozilla’s Firefox were committed to mobile versions of their popular browsers as well. But Google stuck with “Browser” for Android.

And now they may be stuck with it for good. The problem is that Chrome, for better or worse, is now associated with another product that is similar but different from Android — again, Chrome OS. Imagine if they start including a Chrome browser on Android tablets and then next year Chrome OS tablets launch. Consumers will wonder what the hell the difference is? (And this may already prove to be an issue on the PC/Chromebook side of things, we’ll see.)

All that aside, it is still important to remember that Android’s Browser really isn’t Chrome. The two are both based on WebKit and use Google’s V8 JavaScript engine, but there are dozens of other features that Google is trying to associate with Chrome that they couldn’t possibly squeeze into a mobile web browser (at least not yet).

The same issues are true with Apple’s regular Safari browser and their mobile one. But that browser generally seems to be less feature-focused, so the branding might not be as big of an issue. Plus, even if the two sides don’t work closely together inside of Apple (though it seems like they might), does anyone really believe there’s anyway in hell Steve Jobs would let the browser in iOS be called anything but Safari?

Back to Google, on the flip side of things, the Android team has their own wants and needs for the browser bundled with their software. And imagine if a problem on the Chrome team was stalling a new Android build? Or vice versa?

But with the launch of Honeycomb, Android’s Browser is now starting to look a lot more like Chrome as well, thanks to the tabbed browsing experience it offers. This will only lead to more questions. And it’s only a matter of time before users start demanding that elements are fully synced between the two (Chrome and Android’s Browser).

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

LinkedIn Valuation May Be More Like Salesforce Than Facebook


LinkedIn Corp., the first major U.S. social-media company to sell shares to the public, may deserve a valuation that more closely resembles those of business-software makers such as Salesforce.com Inc. than Facebook Inc.

Demand for LinkedIn shares prompted the company to increase the offering twice. The valuation of as much as $4.25 billion implies a multiple of 11.3 times projected annual sales, compared with 13.8 for Facebook and 8.3 for Salesforce.com.

LinkedIn is often compared with social networks such as Facebook and Twitter Inc., which depend on advertising to consumers. Yet LinkedIn gets 70 percent of revenue from business subscriptions, a model that’s similar to Salesforce.com, SuccessFactors Inc. and NetSuite Inc. This dual appeal and faster growth means LinkedIn warrants a higher valuation than other business-software providers, said Brian Jacobs, general partner at Emergence Capital Partners.

“It’s got aspects of the business software world but it also has these aspects of the consumer world,” said Jacobs, who is based in San Mateo, California. “When you’ve got a product that millions of people love, that helps the stock price.” Emergence was an early investor in Salesforce and SuccessFactors.

LinkedIn shares are expected to price later today. The Mountain View, California-based company yesterday increased the range at which they’ll be sold to $42 to $45 apiece, from $32 to $35 as planned last week. LinkedIn is offering 7.84 million shares. At the high end, LinkedIn would raise as much as $405.7 million, if underwriters exercise an overallotment option.

Software Subscriptions

Some investors may purchase LinkedIn shares because they view it as a proxy for social-media companies led by Facebook that have put off IPOs to pursue growth outside the regulatory glare that’s directed at publicly traded companies.

Still, LinkedIn said in its prospectus that a “substantial portion” of revenue comes from a business that’s comparable to the software-as-a-service model. That’s where companies deliver software over the Internet, a market that is expected to climb 16 percent this year to $10.7 billion, according to Gartner Inc., a research firm in Stamford, Connecticut.

“The long-term holders of the stock will be the ones that evaluate it like an enterprise SaaS company versus the ones looking for pure momentum,” said Dave Whorton, founder of Tugboat Ventures in Palo Alto, California, and an early investor in SuccessFactors. “They will have good visibility into what the company is today and what it will be in the future without having to speculate.”

SaaS companies, including Salesforce, NetSuite and SuccessFactors, sell subscriptions over the Internet rather than long-term licenses like traditional business-software companies.

Salesforce is the largest supplier of customer-management software. SuccessFactors makes Web-based human resources software, and NetSuite provides online accounting programs.

Social Network Valuations

Facebook and Twitter, social-networking sites that give their services away, have higher private-market valuations than LinkedIn based on potential revenue from advertisers aiming to reach hundreds of millions of users. Facebook, the world’s largest social-networking site, is valued at $55 billion on secondary exchange SharesPost Inc., while micro-blogging service Twitter is valued at $6.2 billion.

Morgan Stanley, Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. are leading the offering. The stock is expected to begin trading tomorrow under the symbol LNKD on the New York Stock Exchange.

Personal Profiles

LinkedIn members use the site to search for jobs, recruit employees and find industry experts. While users can create personal profiles for free, the company introduced paid subscriptions in 2005, giving recruiters more access to job candidates and providing business professionals ways to communicate with one another.

The hiring solutions business, targeted at recruiters, accounted for about half of LinkedIn’s $93.9 million in first- quarter revenue, with 30 percent coming from ads. The company’s projected valuation of 11.3 times sales assumes first-quarter revenue is replicated over the next three quarters. LinkedIn’s net income rose 14 percent to $2.08 million in the first quarter. Sales more than doubled.

“It is one of the most exciting companies to go public in recent times,” said Jason Rosenthal, chief executive officer of Ning Inc., a social media company in Palo Alto. “They have built a $250 million-a-year revenue business that’s profitable and growing at a fast clip. Something like that deserves to be highly valued.”

Premium Business

Some analysts are skeptical. Ryan Hunter of Wedge Partners Corp. wrote in a report on May 16 that even at $3 billion, LinkedIn may be overvalued. LinkedIn had previously planned a sale that would have given it a valuation at that level.

Hunter sees a conflict between LinkedIn’s premium subscription business and its advertising business. To satisfy subscribers, the company may need to cut out ads to premium members, hurting revenue, he wrote. Rising competition may also force the company to eliminate premium fees to keep users, with Facebook as a looming threat.

“Facebook users have a substantially higher level of engagement than LNKD users,” wrote Hunter, who’s based in Greenwood Village, Colorado. “If Facebook creates a way for users to feel comfortable managing their professional and social networks on the same platform, we would expect LNKD’s value to its users (and shareholders) to rapidly decline.”

In the planned IPO, about 62 percent of the shares in the offering are being sold by LinkedIn, which said it plans to use the proceeds to fund existing operations and to expand the business, possibly including buying other companies or technologies.

The sellers of the other shares include a venture capital affiliate of Bain Capital LLC, McGraw-Hill Cos., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and founder and Chairman Reid Hoffman, the prospectus shows. Venture capital backers Sequoia Capital, Greylock Partners and Bessemer Venture Partners aren’t selling shares, according to the filing.

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